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I. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause, found in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, provides criminal defendants with the right
to confront adverse witnesses.' A literal interpretation of the Confron-
1. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
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tation Clause would preclude courts from allowing the admission of all
hearsay testimony.2 The Court has rejected this interpretation, noting
that it would render meaningless every exception to the rule against
hearsay.3 Although unwilling to hold that the Confrontation Clause
mandates exclusion of all hearsay, the Court has found that the Clause
requires the exclusion of some hearsay statements.4 The Supreme Court
has struggled to define the relationship between the exceptions to the
rule against hearsay5 and the limitations that the Confrontation Clause
imposes.6
In its most recent effort, White v. Illinois,7 the Court held that the
Confrontation Clause does not require the prosecution to show that the
declarant is unavailable prior to the introduction of hearsay statements
under the spontaneous declaration8 and medical diagnosis exceptions9
to the hearsay rule. The White majority explained that its decision in
United States v. Inadi0 limited the unavailability requirement set
forth in Ohio v. Roberts" to out-of-court statements introduced under
the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. 2 In addition, the
Court found that the admission of hearsay testimony and the use of
right.., to be confronted with witnesses against him .... " U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
2. A literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause would require the physical presence
of all adverse witnesses. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Michael H. Gra-
ham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 19, 33 (1985) (reasoning that if a criminal defendant's
right to confront adverse witnesses were absolute, a court could not admit any out-of-court state-
ment even if the statement came within one of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). See also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
182 (1987). For an example of the rule against hearsay, see F.R.E. 802.
4. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. See also Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Ex-
emptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 665, 665 (1986)
(noting that the Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause restricts the use of hearsay
evidence in some instances).
5. See, for example, F.R.E. 803 and 804.
6. See generally Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts,
36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207 (1984); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557 (1988).
7. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
8. Under Illinois law, the spontaneous declaration exception applies to "statement[s] relat-
ing to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition." White, 112 S. Ct. at 740 n.1.
9. Illinois law provides that "statements made by the victim to medical personnel for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule." White, 112 S. Ct. at 740 n.2.
10. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). For discussion of Inadi, see notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
11. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
12. For a discussion of Roberts and the unavailability requirement, see notes 13-26 and ac-
companying text.
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child-protective in-court procedures present discrete Sixth Amendment
problems.
This Recent Development explores the implications of the White
decision. Part II reviews some of the Court's past efforts to define the
interests that the Confrontation Clause protects and delineate the re-
strictions that the Clause places on the admission of hearsay statements
in criminal trials. Part III discusses the White majority's justifications
for allowing the admission of the child victim's out-of-court statements,
and addresses Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, in which he asserts
that the Framers may not have intended for the Confrontation Clause
to restrict the admissibility of hearsay evidence in any way. Part IV
focuses on the aspects of the White decision that illustrate the Court's
movement away from its prior interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause as preferring face-to-face confrontation. In addition, Part IV
considers whether the Court's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause has constitutionalized the hearsay rules, and contemplates what
confrontation protections remain available. This Recent Development
concludes that under the Court's current reading of the Confrontation
Clause, a criminal defendant may have to look beyond the Sixth
Amendment for confrontation protections.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Ohio v. Roberts: The Unavailability Requirement
In Ohio v. Roberts,"8 the Supreme Court considered whether the
trial court properly allowed the admission of an absent witness's pre-
liminary hearing testimony.14 In upholding the trial court's admission of
the testimony, the Court found that the Confrontation Clause restricts
the admission of hearsay in two ways.15 First, consistent with the Fram-
ers' preference for face-to-face confrontation, the Sixth Amendment es-
tablishes a rule of necessity.16 The Court found that generally the
prosecution can meet this requirement by producing the witness or
demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant whose out-of-court
statement it wishes to use against the defendant. 7
If the prosecution establishes that the witness is unavailable, it
must then satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test by showing that
13. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
14. The defendant was charged with forgery, receipt of stolen property, and possession of
heroin. His defense for the first two charges was that Anita Isaacs gave him permission to use her
father's credit card and checkbook. At the preliminary hearing, Ms. Isaacs denied having given the
defendant such permission. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 65.
16. Id.
17. Id.
1993]
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the out-of-court statement is trustworthy.1 8 The Court delineated two
ways in which a court might find that hearsay testimony bears sufficient
"indicia of reliability" that its admission is consistent with the Confron-
tation Clause. 9 First, the prosecution automatically proves trustworthi-
ness if the statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception.
20
The Court reasoned that certain hearsay exceptions are so well-estab-
lished in American jurisprudence that the Sixth Amendment does not
require independent reliability analysis.2 Otherwise, a court must ex-
clude the out-of-court statement unless the prosecution can show that
it bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
22
The Roberts Court found that the trial court correctly concluded
the absent witness was unavailable,23 reasoning that the prosecution es-
tablished that they had made a good-faith effort to produce the declar-
ant.24 The majority also found that the preliminary hearing testimony
of the absent witness bore sufficient indicia of reliability because the
defense attorney, at the preliminary hearing, questioned the declarant
in a manner consistent with traditional cross-examination.25 After find-
ing that the prosecution satisfied the Court's two-part test, it held that
the admission of the absent witness's former testimony did not violate
the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.26
B. United States v. Inadi: Limiting the Unavailability Requirement
In United States v. Inadi,27 the Supreme Court limited the scope
of Roberts. Inadi, who was convicted of various conspiracy charges, ob-
jected when the prosecution sought to introduce his alleged co-conspira-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 65-66. The Court did not define "indicia of reliability."
20. Id. at 66. "Firmly rooted" remains undefined. See note 232 and accompanying text.
21. The Court stated that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that
admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection.'" 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
22. Id. at 65-66. The Court did not give examples of what circumstances might provide "par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
23. Id. at 75. The prosecution made several unsuccessful attempts to produce Ms. Isaacs at
trial. Id. at 59-60.
24. Id. at 74. The Court stated that" '[A] witness is not "unavailable" for purposes of... the
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-
faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.'" Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
25. Id. at 68-73. Defense counsel questioned Ms. Isaacs at length. The defense attorney, how-
ever, did not attempt to have her declared hostile and did not request permission to cross-examine
her. The majority reasoned that the defense counsel's questioning followed the form of a cross-
examination, noting that the questioning was filled with leading questions in order to determine
whether the declarant was telling the truth. Id. at 71.
26. Id. at 77.
27. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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tors' taped conversations at his trial. The district court allowed the
admission of the tapes under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E)2 s
without requiring the prosecution to show that the co-conspirators were
unavailable.29 The appellate court reversed, reasoning that Roberts re-
quired the prosecution to show that the declarant was unavailable prior
to the introduction of the co-conspirators' out-of-court statements.3 0
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, noting
that this interpretation of Roberts would require a complete revision of
the law of evidence.3' The majority stated that Roberts did not man-
date such a broad reading of the Confrontation Clause, 2 and cautioned
that courts should read the Roberts decision narrowly and limit it to its
facts.33 The Court suggested that the application of the Roberts un-
availability analysis is confined to cases involving the introduction of
prior testimony.34
The Inadi Court gave several reasons for requiring the. prosecution
to show unavailability prior to the admission of former testimony, but
not prior to the admission of co-conspirator statements. The Court rea-
soned that former testimony is merely a weak substitute for live testi-
mony and rarely possesses independent evidentiary significance.3 5 The
unavailability requirement ensures that no better form of evidence ex-
ists before allowing the admission of the former testimony.3 6 The Court
distinguished co-conspirator statements from former testimony by de-
termining that the statements provide evidence of independent signifi-
cance about the conspiracy's context that testimony in court cannot
replicate.3 Under the Court's reasoning, the admission of the co-con-
spirators' statements at trial actually enhanced the accuracy of the
28. "A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement
by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." F.R.E.
801(d)(2)(E).
29. 475 U.S. at 390-91.
30. Id. at 391.
31. Id. at 392.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 392-93. The Court unequivocally stated that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to
stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the govern-
ment without a showing that the declarant is unavailable." Id. at 394.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 394-95.
37. Id. at 395. The Court reasoned that co-conspirators are likely to speak more candidly
with each other during the course of their conspiracy than when testifying in court. In addition,
the majority noted that the relationships between the co-conspirators may change between the
time the statements were made and the time of trial. The co-conspirators have gone from partners
in a criminal enterprise to suspects or defendants with potentially damaging information about the
others. Declarants who potentially face indictment or trial may have little incentive to aid the
prosecution and may be cautious about helping their former partners in crime. Id.
1993]
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truth-seeking process, and thus furthered the purposes of the Confron-
tation Clause."
The Court added that requiring a showing of unavailability prior to
the admission of all out-of-court statements actually would provide lit-
tle benefit to criminal defendants.3 9 In effect, the unavailability rule
would not bar the admission of out-of-court statements because the
prosecution would either produce the declarant or make the requisite
showing of unavailability prior to introducing the statement." An un-
availability rule would not exclude any testimony unless the prosecu-
tion did not produce an otherwise available witness. 41 Furthermore, it
would not produce any additional important evidence because either
side could subpoena any helpful witnesses.42 The Court concluded that
requiring a showing of unavailability would unduly burden the prosecu-
tion by requiring it to locate all potential witnesses and ensure their
availability for trial.43 Further, it would burden the courts by adding
another aspect for appellate review in already complex cases." Based
on all these factors, the Court declined to read Roberts as imposing a
general unavailability rule applicable to all out-of-court statements."
C. Idaho v. Wright: Applying the Roberts Analysis to a Child Sex
Abuse Case
The balance between a defendant's confrontation rights and the
admission of out-of-court testimony becomes more complicated in child
sex abuse trials.46 The need for child sex abuse victims' testimony and
the potential for psychological harm to child victims from testifying 8
pose special concerns. The Supreme Court recently has explored the
Confrontation Clause issues that arise when prosecutors introduce hear-
say statements in child sex abuse cases.
38. Id. at 396.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 396-97. In addition, the Court noted that the Compulsory Process Clause would aid
a party in obtaining testimony from out-of-court declarants. Id.
43. Id. at 398-99. The Court's reasoning here is suspect. The Framers intended the Confron-
tation Clause to protect the rights of criminal defendants, and not to ease the prosecution's bur-
den. See David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good
News and Some Bad News, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 51, 81-82 (1988).
44. 475 U.S. at 398.
45. Id. at 399-400.
46. See generally Graham, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 19 (cited in note 2).
47. See id.
48. The trauma of testifying may result in great psychological harm to child sex abuse vic-
tims. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia and the Power and.
Limits of Textualism, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1323, 1324 (1991).
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In Idaho v. Wright,4 the trial court applied Idaho's residual hear-
say exception"0 to allow the admission of statements a three-year-old
girl made to a pediatrician describing her abuse.5 1 The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for sexually abusing her
daughter,52 holding that the admission of the daughter's out-of-court
statements violated the Confrontation Clause. 53 The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed.5
4
The Wright majority applied the Roberts test,5 5 first noting the
trial court's determination that the three year-old 51 was unable to tes-
tify, and then assuming that if the unavailability requirement applied
to this case the prosecution had met its evidentiary burden.57 The
Court addressed the reliability prong of the Roberts test5s and found
that Idaho's residual hearsay exception was not firmly rooted.5 9 As a
result, the prosecution had the burden of showing that the circum-
stances surrounding the hearsay statement rebutted the presumption
that the hearsay was unreliable.6 0
The Court found that admission of firmly rooted hearsay state-
ments satisfies the Roberts reliability requirement because longstanding
judicial and legislative assessments of trustworthiness ensure the relia-
bility of out-of-court statements that fall within certain hearsay excep-
49. 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
50. Idaho's residual hearsay exception allows the admission of:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasona-
ble efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Idaho R. Evid. 803(24). See Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3144.
51. The trial court determined that the child was not capable of effectively testifying. 110 S.
Ct. at 3143.
52. Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles were convicted of lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen. Giles allegedly had sexual intercourse with Wright's daughter while Wright held her down
and covered her mouth. Id.
53. Id. at 3145.
54. Id.
55. See notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
56. The trial involved allegations of sexual abuse concerning Wright's two daughters.
Wright's subsequent appeal related only to the conviction involving the younger daughter, who was
three years old at the time of the trial. 110 S. Ct. at 3143.
57. Id. at 3147. The Court stated that "we assume without deciding that, to the extent the
unavailability requirement applies in this case, the younger daughter was an unavailable witness
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." Id.
58. Id. at 3147. See notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
59. The Court reasoned that if it held that the residual hearsay exception was firmly rooted,
"virtually every codified hearsay exception would assume constitutional stature." 110 S. Ct. at
3148.
60. Id. at 3150.
1993]
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tions.6 The residual hearsay exception, however, allows courts to make
ad hoc determinations of whether statements that do not fall within
recognized hearsay exceptions nonetheless are reliable enough to justify
their admission at trial.62 The majority reasoned that need for this type
of ad hoc analysis illustrates that the residual exception does not share
the same history of reliability with firmly rooted exceptions. 3
The majority declined to set forth a mechanical test for determin-
ing when hearsay that is not introduced under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
6 4
The Court chose a reliability test that allows consideration of the evi-
dence surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement and cir-
cumstances that would render the declarant particularly credible.65 The
reliability test is satisfied if the declarant's truthfulness is so evident
from the surrounding circumstances that the defendant could gain little
from cross-examination.6 Applying this test to the doctor's hearsay
statements at issue in Wright, the Court concluded that the three-year-
old daughter's out-of-court statements did not possess particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify their admissibility.6 7
The Court further held that corroborative evidence, such as medical ev-
idence of injuries consistent with the child's statements, was irrelevant
in determining whether she was telling the truth at the time she made
the statements. 8
61. Id. at 3147.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3148. The Court stated that "[h]earsay statements admitted under the residual
exception, almost by definition, therefore do not share the same tradition of reliability that sup-
ports the admissibility of statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id.
64. Id. at 3149. The Court identified several factors trial courts may consider such as sponta-
neity, the declarant's state of mind, and the lack of a motive to fabricate. The Court made clear
that these factors were not exclusive. Id. at 3150.
65. Id. at 3148.
66. Id. at 3149. The majority stated that the truthfulness of the declarant's statement must
be "so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of
marginal utility." Id.
67. Id. at 3153.
68. The Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause required restriction of the admission
of hearsay evidence to only those circumstances in which such evidence "possess[ed] indicia of
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial." Id.
at 3150. The majority found that the Confrontation Clause would not allow the "admission of a
presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at
trial." Id. In addition, the Court noted that corroborative evidence may foster false conclusions by
the jury because such evidence indicates nothing about the identity of an abuser. Allowing corrob-
orative evidence would pose the danger of the jury relying on partial corroboration to conclude
that the entire statement was true. Id. at 3151.
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D. Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig: The Necessity Requirement
The potential psychological trauma associated with requiring child
sex abuse victims to testify in the courtroom in the accused's presence
has influenced the majority of states to institute special proecdures for
testifying child witnesses.6 9 The Supreme Court has found that these
procedures implicate the Confrontation Clause.70 In Coy v. Iowa71 and
Maryland v. Craig,7 2 the Court addressed the Confrontation Clause
concerns that arise when a child testifies in court aided by the use of
protective courtroom measures.
In Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court held that the placement of a
protective screen between a child witness and the defendant 3 violated
the Confrontation Clause. 4 The Court acknowledged that some of its
prior decisions had placed limits on a criminal defendant's ability to
confront witnesses, such as restricting the scope of cross-examination
and allowing the admission of certain out-of-court statements. 5 The
Court, however, distinguished these limitations by declaring that once a.
witness appears to testify, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the de-
fendant a face-to-face meeting with the witness.76 The Court reasoned
that mandating a face-to-face encounter with witnesses serves the dual
purpose of creating the appearance of fairness77 and "ensuring the in-
tegrity of the factfinding process. '78
The prosecution's use of a screen to shield the child witness vio-
lated the defendant's right to confrontation because that method is not
69. See Wildenthal, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1324 (cited in note 48) (finding that concern
about psychogical trauma associated with testifying and the effect of such trauma on the truth-
seeking function of a trial lead the majority of the states to establish special procedures for child
witnesses). See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167-68 & nn.2-4 (1990)
(listing the number of states that have established some kind of child-protective courtroom
procedure).
70. See notes 71-103 and accompanying text.
71. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
72. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
73. Section 910A.14 of the Iowa Code provides that a court may allow a child to testify be-
hind a screen or by closed-circuit television. In Coy the lighting and the screen were adjusted so
that the witness could not see the defendant but the defendant could see the witness faintly. 487
U.S. at 1014-15.
74. Id. at 1022.
75. Id. at 1016.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1017, 1019.
78. Id. at 1020 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)). The Court deter-
mined that requiring a witness to testify in the defendant's presence enhances the fairness of the
judicial proceeding, due to the tensions inherent in facing the accused. The Court stated: "Face-to-
face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same
token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent
adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
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firmly rooted in the Court's jurisprudence, and the prosecution did not
make a specific showing that the witness needed this protection.79 The
majority left open the question of whether exceptions may exist to a
criminal defendant's right to confront trial witnesses face-to-face, not-
ing that if such exceptions exist they would be justified only if neces-
sary to further an important public policy objective.8 0
In Craig, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether
such exceptions to the face-to-face confrontation right exist.81 The
Craig Court determined that under certain circumstances a court may
place limitations on a defendant's confrontation rights. In this instance,
the Court allowed the prosecution to use a one-way closed circuit televi-
sion to facilitate the in-court testimony of two child sex abuse victims. S2
While acknowledging that Coy held that the Confrontation Clause
protects a criminal defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation of
adverse witnesses who appear at trial, the Craig Court noted that Coy
did not hold that this right is absolute.8 3 The Court stated that in Coy
the prosecution had not made an individualized showing that the wit-
nesses needed protection. Thus, the Coy Court did not need to decide if
there were exceptions, based on the necessity of protecting child wit-
nesses, to a criminal defendant's right to face witnesses who appear
before the trier of fact.8 4 In Craig, the trial court's individualized find-
ings that the child witnesses who testified against the accused needed
special protection required the Court to consider the question it left
unanswered in Coy.85 The Craig Court held that under certain narrow
circumstances, a court may deny a criminal defendant the right to face
an in-court declarant.88 A court may only permit the prosecution to use
a procedure that prevents physical confrontation at trial if the prosecu-
tion satisfies two requirements.8
First, the procedure must be necessary to further an important
public policy.8 The Court found that a state's interest in protecting
child victims from further trauma was a compelling public policy con-
cern.8 9 Under some circumstances, a state's interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of a child may outweigh a defend-
79. Id. at 1020-21.
80. Id. at 1021.
81. 110 S. Ct. at 3163-66.
82. Id. at 3160.
83. Id. at 3163.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 3165.
87. Id. at 3166.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3167.
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ant's right to face in-court accusers.9 0 The prosecution can satisfy the
necessity requirement only if the trial court has made a case-specific
determination 1 that the child witness would suffer more than minimal
trauma92 if required to testify in the defendant's presence.93
Second, the procedures must ensure the reliability of evidence.
4
The prosecution satisfies this prong when it employs procedures that
subject the evidence to sufficient adversarial testing to preserve "the
essence of effective confrontation."95
The Court found that the Maryland statute met these two require-
ments.9 The prosecution met the necessity requirement by presenting
expert testimony that the child witnesses would suffer serious emo-
tional distress and would be unable to communicate if required to tes-
tify in the defendant's presence.9 7 The Craig Court also found that the
procedures of the Maryland statute ensured the reliability of the testi-
mony. 8 The Court noted that although Maryland's procedures prevent
the defendant from seeing the child witness who testifies at trial, the
procedures ensure other elements of the confrontation right.9 9 The child
witness must be competent and must testify under oath.100 The defend-
ant has full opportunity to cross-examine the declarant while viewing
the demeanor of the witness. 101 In addition, the factfinder can observe
the demeanor of the testifying witness.102 The Court noted that the as-
surances of reliability present in these circumstances were greater than
those required for the admission of hearsay evidence under Roberts.0 3
90. Id.
91. The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether a particular child witness
requires the protection that the use of the one-way television affords. Id. at 3169.
92. The Court did not discern precisely what level of trauma was required to meet the ne-
cessity requirement. The Court, however, found that the level required by the Maryland statute
was sufficient. Id. Maryland authorizes the use of closed-circuit television in cases in which the
witness is the alleged victim of child abuse. Md. Cts and Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 (1989).
Section 9-102 requires that prior to allowing the use of a closed-circuit television, a judge must
determine that the child would suffer serious emotional distress as a result of testifying in the
courtroom and would be unable to communicate. 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
93. The child must suffer trauma due to the presence of the defendant, not merely trauma
associated with the courtroom. A court could remedy the latter situation by having the child tes-
tify in the presence of the defendant in more comfortable surroundings. Id.
94. Id. at 3166.
95. Id. at 3170.
96. Id. at 3169.
97. Id. at 3161, 3169.
98. Id. at 3169.
99. Id. at 3166.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3167. The Court reasoned that if the child was forced to testify in a traumatic
setting the truth-seeking goal of the Confrontation Clause might be hindered.
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III. WHAT REMAINS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR FACE-
TO-FACE CONFRONTATION?: WHITE V. ILLINOIS
White v. IllinoisT" is *the Supreme Court's most recent effort to
define the balance between the Confrontation Clause and the admission
of out-of-court statements. In White, the defendant was convicted of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential burglary, and unlawful
restraint.10 5 The prosecution's case consisted of the testimony of five
witnesses who recounted the out-of-court statements of the child vic-
tim, S.G. 10 6 The child did not testify at trial. 10 7
Tony DeVore was babysitting in S.G.'s home the night of the as-
sault.108 DeVore testified that she ran into S.G.'s bedroom after she
heard S.G. scream. 10 9 Devore saw the defendant, Mr. White, leave the
bedroom.1 0 While S.G. was still very upset, she told DeVore how the
defendant had assaulted her."' Tammy Grisby, S.G.'s mother, testified
that when she arrived home approximately thirty minutes later, S.G.
told her substantially the same story.1 14 A few minutes later Officer
Lewis arrived at the home and questioned S.G.11 3 Lewis's testimony was
essentially the same as that of DeVore and Grisby." 4 Despite the de-
fendant's objections, the trial court admitted the testimony of DeVore,
Grisby, and Lewis under the spontaneous declaration exception to the
rule against hearsay.
Cheryl Reents, an emergency room nurse, interviewed S.G. at ap-
proximately eight o'clock the next morning.1 6 In response to Reents'
questions, S.G. recounted the previous night's events." 7 Dr. Michael
Meinzen testified that S.G. recited the same facts when he spoke with
her to obtain her medical history." 8 The trial court admitted the testi-
mony of Reents and Meinzen under the medical diagnosis exception
104. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
105. Id. at 739.
106. Id. at 739-40.
107. Id. at 739. On two occasions, the prosecution attempted to call S.G. as a witness, but
each time she experienced emotional difficulty and did not testify. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Devore testified that S.G. said that the defendant choked her, put his hand over her
mouth, told her that he would hit her if she screamed, and then he improperly touched her. Id.
112. Grisby testified that S.G. told her that "'Randy" put his hand over her mouth,
threatened to hit her if she screamed, and then assaulted her. Id. The defendant's name is Randal
White.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 740. See note 8 for an explanation of the spontaneous declaration exception.
116. Id. at 739.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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and the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule." 9
On appeal, in People v. White," ° the defendant challenged the ad-
missibility of the witnesses' statements. The Illinois appellate court
found that the trial court correctly admitted the testimony of the five
witnesses. 121 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the Con-
frontation Clause required it to determine that S.G. was unavailable to
testify before admitting the hearsay evidence. 121
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding.2 2 The
White Court limited its analysis to whether the trial court's admission
of the hearsay evidence' 21 violated the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights and held that admission of the evidence was
constitutional.1 25
The United States presented an amicus curiae brief, 2 6 arguing
that the prosecution threatens a criminal defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights only when it seeks to introduce ex parte affidavits 1 7 with-
out producing the affiants at trial.2 s Because S.G.'s statements were
not contained in ex parte affidavits, the United States suggested that
the Confrontation Clause would not restrict their admission.2 9 In dis-
missing this argument, the Court noted that such a narrow interpreta-
tion essentially would abrogate any Confrontation Clause limitations on
the admission of out-of-court statements under the hearsay excep-
tions. 30 The majority concluded that, according to precedent, the
United States interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was
incorrect.' 31
119. Id. at 740. See note 9 for the text of the medical diagnosis exception.
120. 555 N.E.2d 1241 (1990).
121. Id. at 1243.
122. Id. at 1251-52. The petitioner argued that Roberts required a prior showing of unavaila-
bility. For a discussion of the Roberts unavailability analysis, see notes 15-24 and accompanying
text.
123. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
124. The Court assumed that the testimony properly fell within the applicable hearsay ex-
ceptions. Id. at 740 n.4.
125. Id. at 739-40.
126. Id. at 740-41.
127. Id. An ex parte affidavit is an out-of-court statement made under circumstances that
imply that the affiant made the statement for the purpose of incriminating the defendant. Id. at
741.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The Court reasoned that under the position of the United States, the Confrontation
Clause would apply only to hearsay contained in the form of an ex parte affidavit. Id.
131. The majority stated that the Court has been careful "not to equate the Confrontation
Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements." Id.
1993]
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The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that Roberts re-
quired the party seeking to introduce the hearsay testimony to either
produce the declarant at trial or show the declarant's unavailability.132
The Court found that such a reading of the Confrontation Clause was
foreclosed by Inadi, in which the Court determined that the unavaila-
bility analysis is only applicable when the declarant made the disputed
out-of-court statements in a prior judicial proceeding.13 3 The Court
made clear that its reasoning in Inadi, which was formulated in the
context of co-conspirator's statements, applied to White as well. 134
The Court first examined the evidentiary rationale for allowing the
admission of hearsay evidence under the spontaneous declaration and
medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions. 13 5 Such statements are made in
contexts that provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and
testimony in court cannot recapture the factors that ensure the reliabil-
ity of the statements.3 6 The Court reasoned that the hearsay state-
ments at issue had substantial probative value simply because they
were made out-of-court under circumstances in which fabrication was
unlikely. 3 7 This guarantee of trustworthiness would not be present if
the declarant testified in court.13  The Court further justified the ad-
mission of the hearsay testimony by proposing that there would be little
benefit to implementing a general unavailability rule, 3 and that such a
(quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990)). The Court, however, reasoned that the
Confrontation Clause must apply to hearsay, finding that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values" and "stem from the same roots." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
132. Id.
133. "Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of
the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in
the course of a prior judicial proceeding." Id. For a discussion of Inadi, see notes 27-45 and accom-
panying text.
134. 112 S. Ct. at 742-43.
135. Id.
136. With regard to spontaneous declarations, the Court reasoned that statements made "in
a moment of excitement-without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's exclama-
tion-may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the
relative calm of the courtroom." Id. at 742-43. In the context of statements made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis, the Court noted that a statement made "where the declarant knows that a
false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility
that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony." Id. at 743.
137. Id. at 742.
138. The Court distinguished the hearsay testimony of White from the statements made in
the preliminary hearing in Roberts. The Court reasoned that because the prior statements at issue
in Roberts were made in the context of a judicial proceeding there was "no threat of lost eviden-
tiary value if the out-of-court statements were replaced with live testimony." Id. at 743.
139. Id. at 742-43. The Court relied on Inadi for the proposition that an unavailability rule
was likely to produce little benefit. Id. at 742. The Court reasoned that an unavailability rule
would not be an absolute bar to out-of-court testimony because the prosecution could introduce
the testimony by producing the declarant at trial or after a showing that the declarant is unavaila-
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mandate would impose great litigation costs. 140
The Court concluded that it would be wrong to exclude the hearsay
statements under the guise of the Confrontation Clause 14 1 because these
statements had substantial probative value that in-court testimony
could not duplicate. 4 2 The majority set forth the broad proposition
that when out-of-court statements possess guarantees of reliability suf-
ficient to fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Confronta-
tion Clause's demands are satisfied. 43
The defendant in White based his final argument on the Coy and
Craig decisions, asserting that these cases established that a court may
permit hearsay testimony relating a child's out-of-court statements only
if necessary to protect the child's psychological and physical well-be-
ing.14 4 The Court distinguished both Coy and Craig, stating those hold-
ings addressed the Confrontation Clause mandates on the use of special
in-court procedures. 45 The majority determined that the question in
Coy and Craig was different from the question of what requirements a
court must impose before it allows the introduction of out-of-court
statements.1 6 The Court found no justification for imposing a necessity
requirement prior to admitting testimony through well-recognized hear-
say exceptions. 147
B. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part with the majority opinion and concurring in the
judgment.148 Justice Thomas's premise was that the majority reached
the correct decision under the Court's prior Confrontation Clause juris-
ble. In addition, the Court stated that an unavailability requirement would add little to the truth-
determining process because either party could subpoena witnesses and obtain testimony facili-
tated by evidentiary rules and the Compulsory Process Clause. Id. at 742. For a discussion of
Inadi, see notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
140. 112 S. Ct. at 743.
141. Id.
142. The Court stated that to keep the hearsay testimony out "would be the height of wrong-
headedness" because the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to promote the "integrity of the
factfinding process." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. For discussion of the Coy and Craig decisions, see notes 73-103 and accompanying
text.
145. 112 S. Ct. at 743-44.
146. Id. at 744.
147. The Court made no attempt to explain why the two questions merit different treatment.
Id. The Court stated that "[t]here is thus no basis for importing the 'necessity requirement' an-
nounced in those cases into the much different context of out-of-court declarations admitted under
the established exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id.
148. Id. at 744-48 (Thomas concurring).
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prudence. 149 He asserted, however, that the Court's precedent was in-
consistent with the text and history of the Clause.150 Justice Thomas
argued that the Supreme Court had based its prior decisions addressing
the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay on the
faulty assumption that any hearsay declarant is a "witness against" a
defendant and thus subject to the Clause's mandates. 15' Nothing in the
history of the common-law right of confrontation indicated that the
Confrontation Clause was intended to apply to hearsay. 5 2 In addition,
Justice Thomas asserted that the text of the Sixth Amendment did not
support the Court's standards for evaluating confrontation rights and
the admission of hearsay.'53 He reasoned that under the majority's
analysis the Confrontation Clause bars only unreliable hearsay, but
noted the Clause's language makes no distinction between reliable and
unreliable evidence. 54
Justice Thomas considered several possible interpretations of the
Confrontation Clause. 55 He rejected the Wigmore-Harlan view 56 that
the Confrontation Clause only gives a defendant the right to confront
and cross-examine those witnesses who appear at trial. 57 Rather, Jus-
tice Thomas found merit in the approach the United States suggested
in its amicus curiae brief, that the Confrontation Clause only protects
defendants from the admission of ex parte affidavits when the affiant
149. Id. at 744 (Thomas concurring).
150. Id. (Thomas concurring).
151. Id. (Thomas concurring). As examples of cases based on such a faulty assumption, Jus-
tice Thomas cited Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); and
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). Justice Thomas argued that the text and history of the
Clause do not support this assumption. 112 S. Ct. at 744 (Thomas concurring).
152. Justice Thomas asserted that prosecution by ex parte affidavits, in lieu of courtroom
examination of adverse witnesses, was the primary evil that the Confrontation Clause was designed
to eradicate. Thus, he reasoned that the confrontation right developed in order to restrict the use
of ex parte affidavits and not to restrict the admission of hearsay. 112 S. Ct. at 746 (Thomas
concurring).
153. Id. at 746-47 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas argued that the Confrontation
Clause's text and history did not support the application of the Roberts test. Id. at 746 (Thomas
concurring).
154. Id. (Thomas concurring) Justice Thomas reasoned that under the Court's hearsay analy-
sis the Confrontation Clause would allow the admission of reliable ex parte affidavits. He argued
that this was not intended by the Sixth Amendment's drafters. Id. at 746-47 (Thomas concurring).
155. Justice Thomas noted that virtually no evidence exists to clarify the Framers' intent in
drafting the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 744 (Thomas concurring).
156. For a discussion of the Wigmore approach, see J. Wigmore, Evidence § 13.97 at 159
(1974). Justice Harlan adopted Wigmore's interpretation in his concurring opinion in Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970).
157. White, 112 S. Ct. at 744-45 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas found that the Wig-
more-Harlan approach was at odds with the history surrounding the evolution of the common-law
right to confrontation and the Supreme Court's prior cases interpreting the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at 745 (Thomas concurring).
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does not testify at trial.158 Justice Thomas interpreted the United
States argument to mean that the Confrontation Clause only applies to
testimony of in-court declarants or the functional equivalent of in-court
testimony, such as affidavits, confessions, or depositions that are pre-
pared in contemplation of legal proceedings. 1 9 He concluded that this
approach was unworkable, however, because courts would have diffi-
culty determining which statements were made in contemplation of le-
gal proceedings.1 6 0  As a result, he reasoned that this line of
confrontation inquiry might be inconsistent with the meaning of the
Clause. 1"
Justice Thomas proposed a modification of the United States argu-
ment, which he believed was consistent with the Confrontation Clause's
text and history, as well as with existing precedent.16 2 Justice Thomas
concluded that a defendant's right to confront witnesses extends to all
witnesses who testify at trial. However, the defendant's right to con-
front witnesses who have made extrajudicial statements is limited to
those memorialized in formalized testimonial materials. 163 Justice
Thomas argued that this application of the Confrontation Clause would
protect best against the type of testimony that prosecutors historically
have abused1 64 and it would remain consistent with the Court's pre-
Roberts precedent. 165 In addition, this approach would greatly simplify
Confrontation Clause inquiry in the hearsay context 6 6 and would elimi-
nate the danger of constitutionalizing the hearsay rule. 67 Although not
158. For a discussion of the United States ex parte affidavit argument, see notes 126-31 and
accompanying text.
159. 112 S. Ct. at 747 (Thomas concurring).
160. Id. (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas used'S.G.'s statements to the police officer as
an example. He reasoned that the statements could be the functional equivalent of in-court testi-
mony, noting that the statements arguably were made in contemplation of legal proceedings. Jus-
tice Thomas found that this illustrated that few statements could be categorized as restricted by
the Confrontation Clause. Thus, courts might have great difficulty determining to which state-
ments the Clause applies.
161. Id. (Thomas concurring).
162. Id. (Thomas concurring).
163. Id. (Thomas concurring). Formalized testimonial materials include materials "such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." Id. (Thomas concurring).
164. Justice Thomas reasoned that affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions
were the types of testimonial materials historically abused by the prosecutors in order to deprive
criminal defendants of their right to an adversarial proceeding. Id. (Thomas concurring).
165. Id. at 747-48 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas noted that the cases prior to Roberts
involved the admission of prior testimony or confessions. Id. at 748 (Thomas concurring).
166. Id. at 748 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas reasoned that the Court would no
longer have to focus on which hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted.
167. Justice Thomas stated:
Neither the language of the Clause nor the historical evidence appears to support the notion
that the Confrontation Clause was intended to constitutionalize the hearsay rule and its ex-
ceptions. Although the Court repeatedly has disavowed any intent to cause that result .... I
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completely convinced that the Confrontation Clause applies to any
form of hearsay, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court should con-
sider this novel interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. 16 8
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
enunciated a number of interests that the Clause was designed to pro-
tect. Among these, the Court has found that the Confrontation Clause
was intended to ensure cross-examination" 9 and to prevent prosecution
by depositions or ex parte affidavits in lieu of live testimony,1 0 in addi-
tion to ensuring the admission of reliable and probative evidence."17
Commentators also have proposed various interpretations of the Con-
frontation Clause's intended protections, including requiring the testing
of evidence in front of a jury, 217  ensuring an adversarial trial,"17 man-
dating the production of all available witnesses,' 7 and safeguarding the
fear that our decisions have edged ever further in that direction."
Id. (Thomas concurring).
168. Id. (Thomas concurring).
169. See, for example, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (stating that one
purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to preserve the right to cross-examine witnesses); Doug-
las v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (stating that the primary right that the Confrontation
Clause secures is the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64
(1980) (recognizing the role of cross-examination in protecting the accuracy of the trial process
under the Confrontation Clause).
In fact, the White Court noted that "[t]he preference for live testimony in the case of state-
ments like those offered in Roberts is because of the importance of cross-examination, 'the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.'" 112 S. Ct. at 743 (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). However, the context in which the Court made this statement
may indicate that the court found cross-examination important only in cases involving former tes-
timony, such as Roberts. This conclusion is supported further by the Inadi Court's assertion that it
is constitutionally permissible to dispense with cross-examination when the uncross-examined tes-
timony possesses greater evidentiary value than would in-court testimony. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at
394-95.
170. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 (announcing that the primary purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to prevent the use of depositions or ex parte affidavits in lieu of examining the witnesses
face-to-face in front of a jury).
171. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
172. Jonakait, 35 UCLA L. Rev. at 578 (cited in note 6).
173. Professor Jonakait has argued that the Framers' intent in drafting the Confrontation
Clause was to guarantee the accused an adversarial trial. Id. at 585. He reasoned that the Court
must look to see if a disputed practice impedes the adversarial process, not whether it promotes
accuracy in the truth-determining process. Id. at 586. Under Professor Jonakait's theory, the
White Court's justifications for admitting the "more reliable" hearsay evidence are misdirected.
Pursuant to his theory, the Court should ask not whether the hearsay is sufficiently reliable, but
whether its admission is permissible under our adversarial system.
174. Professor Lilly has suggested that the Confrontation Clause is not limited to protecting
the adversarial process. Lilly, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 213 (cited in note 6). He reasoned that the
Confrontation Clause may have constitutionalized the common-law right of confrontation. Id. At
common law, the accused had the right to confront any witness that the prosecution reasonably
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fairness of the trial process.175 The relationship between the Confronta-
tion Clause and the hearsay exceptions continues to be the subject of
much debate.
In the line of cases beginning with Roberts, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Confrontation Clause too narrowly. Although the in-
tended meaning of the Clause is unclear, it must protect more than just
a criminal defendant's right to the admission of reliable and probative
evidence. 17  Reliability and probativeness are accounted for already by
the evidence rules and cannot delineate the outer boundaries of con-
frontation protection.
Pre-White, the Supreme Court protected more than reliability and
probativeness by consistently expressing a preference for face-to-face
confrontation.177 The Court always has recognized some instances in
which a court might deny a defendant's right to face an accuser without
violating the Constitution.1 78 The White decision, however, represents a
synthesis of the Supreme Court's recent holdings that have reduced a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse wit-
nesses by moving away from a preference for face-to-face confrontation.
The Court's abandonment of this preference disregards other interests
could produce. Id. In other words, the presence of an available declarant was always preferable,
regardless of whether the declarant's statements came within a hearsay exception. Id. The Lilly
approach requires the production of available declarants irrespective of whether their statements
fall within a hearsay exception.
175. Many scholars believe that the Confrontation Clause originated as a reaction to wrong-
ful convictions obtained through prosecutorial misconduct like that which occurred in the trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh. See, for example, Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court's Bifurcated Interpreta-
tion of the Confrontation Clause, 17 Hastings Const. L. Q. 383, 393 (Winter 1990); Toni M. Mas-
saro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1988). Sir
Walter Raleigh was executed as a result of his 1603 trial in which he was convicted of treason,
based on a sworn affidavit by Lord Cobham which allegedly was obtained under duress. The prose-
cution introduced Lord Cobham's affidavit at trial in spite of the fact that he had recanted his
affidavit and was available to testify at the trial. Shaviro, 17 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 384. See also
John W. Strong, ed., 2 McCormick on Evidence § 244 at 90-93 (West, 4th ed. 1992).
176. If the Framers were concerned with preventing the kinds of abuses discussed in note
175, it is reasonable to assume that ensuring the introduction of reliable and probative out-of-court
statements was not the Confrontation Clause's only intended objective. The Framers also must
have been concerned with limiting the prosecution's introduction of hearsay.
177. See, for example, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (stating that "it is this
literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause"); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (noting that "[tihe Court has emphasized
that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial");
Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147 (reaffirming the Roberts proposition that the Confrontation Clause
indicates a preference for face-to-face confrontation). But see Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165 (citing
Roberts for the proposition that the Confrontation Clause establishes a preference for face-to-face
confrontation, but emphasizing that the preference is not an absolute guarantee of such
confrontation).
178. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165; Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399-40; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
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that the Framers may have intended for the Confrontation Clause to
safeguard.
A. Interpreting the Confrontation Clause to Prefer the Admission
of Hearsay Statements
The White Court set forth an interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause that favors the admission of hearsay statements in certain in-
stances. The Court made its preference for hearsay statements clear in
several ways. By declining to read Coy and Craig as requiring a showing
of necessity prior to the admission of hearsay testimony, 17 9 the Court
produced an incentive for prosecutors to introduce hearsay testimony
relating child witnesses' out-of-court statements rather than have the
children testify via protective in-court procedures. In doing so, the
Court indicated that the introduction of hearsay testimony is more con-
sistent with the Confrontation Clause's preference for face-to-face con-
frontation than is the admission of in-court testimony via child-
protective procedures.
A second way in which the Court indicated its preference for hear-
say statements was by unequivocally limiting the Roberts unavailability
requirement to the admission of former testimony. For out-of-court
statements admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Court
interpreted the Confrontation Clause to demand nothing more than the
rules of evidence require. After White, a prosecutor may introduce
firmly rooted hearsay without any additional confrontation analysis,
leaving no Sixth Amendment restraints to protect a criminal defendant.
The Court underscored its preference for hearsay statements by
clarifying the Inadi holding. 80 In Inadi, the Court declared that in cer-
tain instances hearsay testimony possesses greater evidentiary value
than in-court testimony, and thus is more consistent with the goals of
the Confrontation Clause.' 8' According to the White Court, Inadi
meant that admission of certain out-of-court statements actually is
preferable to requiring the witness to testify in court. 82 This preference
for certain out-of-court statements creates the incentive for prosecutors
to introduce the hearsay statements of all potentially hostile witnesses,
including available witnesses, if the hearsay is particularly favorable to
the state's case. After White, a criminal defendant should expect to face
the admission of more hearsay testimony and to have less opportunities
to confront adverse witnesses.
179. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
180. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
181. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96. See also notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
182. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742-43. See also notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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1. Confining the Necessity Requirement to the Admission
of In-Court Statements Made Pursuant to
Child-Protective Procedures
The White majority summarily rejected the petitioner's argument
that Coy and Craig established a rule of necessity 83 that the prosecu-
tion must meet before a court should admit hearsay evidence in lieu of
requiring a child witness to testify.184 In Craig, the Court established
that the prosecution must show that the use of special in-court proce-
dures was necessary to protect the child's physical and psychological
well-being before a court may allow the procedures' use.'85 In formulat-
ing the necessity requirement, the Coy and Craig Courts displayed a
strong preference for face-to-face confrontation. The majority in each of
those cases recognized that this right was not absolute, but declined to
dispense with a defendant's confrontation right absent a particularized
showing of need. 8 ' In doing so, these Courts placed a premium on a
defendant's right to physically confront accusers.
The White Court limited the necessity analysis of Coy and Craig to
situations in which a witness testifies via special'in-court procedures.187
The Court found that these Confrontation Clause prerequisites were in-
applicable for purposes of the introduction of hearsay statements.'88
The majority in White showed greater concern for preserving physical
face-to-face confrontation when a child witness testifies in court using
special procedures than when the prosecution introduces hearsay evi-
dence.'89 Although the Confrontation Clause does not contain the words
"face-to-face," and the meaning of the Clause continues to be the sub-
ject of much debate,9 0 the Court chose a literal interpretation of a de-
fendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. The Court made a
formalistic distinction between the Confrontation Clause analysis that
is required in the case of hearsay testimony and that which is required
for in-court testimony using procedures designed to protect a child wit-
ness. This distinction may be inappropriate in several respects.
Under the White Court's approach, the extent of a criminal de-
183. For a discussion of the necessity requirement, see notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
184. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text. The White, Coy and Craig decisions only dis-
cuss special procedures designed to protect child witnesses. This Recent Development does not
address whether the necessity requirement might apply in other contexts.
185. See notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of the necessity requirement see notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
187. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743-44. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
188. 112 S. Ct. at 744. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
189. 112 S. Ct. at 744. The majority stated that "[a]s we recognized in Coy, the admissibility
of hearsay statements raises concerns lying at the periphery of those that the Confrontation Clause
is designed to address." Id.
190. See notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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fendant's confrontation right changes depending on whether the declar-
ant is testifying in-court via special procedures or whether the
prosecution is introducing the declarant's testimony under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.191 In the former circumstance the defendant
has the right to face adverse witnesses, at least via closed-circuit televi-
sion; in the latter situation the defendant has no right to confront the
declarant at all.192 The White Court never explained why the Confron-
tation Clause mandates treating out-of-court declarants differently
from in-court declarants.' 9'
The Court's formalistic distinction between the confrontation pro-
tections required for testimony via in-court procedures and those re-
quired prior to the admission of hearsay is illogical. The Court, by its
owii admission in Craig, has noted that the protections afforded a crim-
inal defendant when a child witness testifies via special in-court proce-
dures are greater than those required prior to admitting hearsay
evidence."9 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that the
child-protective procedures in Craig embodied three important trial
features: oath, cross-examination, and the jury's ability to observe the
witness. 19 The Court, therefore, imposes more requirements prior to
the use of in-court procedures that provide greater adversarial protec-
tion than it does prior to the admission of hearsay. Craig's more func-
tional view of the Confrontation Clause focuses on protecting the
defendant's right to an adversarial system. In contrast, White's strict
adherence to a formalistic interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
requires only the physical confrontation of adverse witnesses who ap-
pear in court, not a check on the adversarial process. 96 In light of the
confusion regarding the proper meaning of the Confrontation Clause, it
191. Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Di-
mensional Confrontation Clause; 76 Minn. L. Rev. 623, 630-31 (1992).
192. Id.
193. The Court made conclusory statements that the two lines of analysis were completely
separate. White, 112 S. Ct. at 744. Professor Scallen has argued that there is no reason to treat in-
court witnesses and hearsay declarants differently for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis.
For illustration, she noted that under Federal Rule of Evidence 806 there is no distinction between
a hearsay declarant and an in-court declarant for impeachment purposes. Scallen, 76 Minn. L. Rev.
at 631 n.35 (cited in note 191).
194. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. See also note 103 and accompanying text.
195. 110 S. Ct. at 3166. Justice O'Connor found that "these assurances of reliability and
adversariness are far greater than those required for admission of hearsay testimony under the
Confrontation Clause." Id. at 3167. See note' 99-103 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the Court's functional, as opposed to formalistic, approach to the
Confrontation Clause, see Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trial and the Confrontation of
Traumatized Witnesses: Defining "Confrontation" to Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 185, 209-10 (1991).
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is unclear that this formalistic distinction is true to the Framers'
intentions. 197
The adversarial checks provided by the in-court procedures not
only help ensure the reliability and probativeness of evidence, but also
protect other interests. The ability to observe a child's demeanor and
the opportunity to cross-examine the child not only allow the factfinder
to evaluate the evidence to determine how reliable and probative it is,
but at the same time preserve the appearance of fairness in the trial
process. These child-protective in-court procedures may be more consis-
tent with the goals of the Confrontation Clause than the admission of
hearsay testimony.
By limiting the necessity requirement to testimony via special in-
court procedures, the majority in White makes it more difficult for a
prosecutor to bring an available child witness into court to testify under
special procedures than for the prosecutor to introduce hearsay testi-
mony. This creates the incentive for the prosecution to introduce hear-
say testimony relating the out-of-court statements of an available child
witness because the court will impose fewer requirements.19 8 The prose-
cution may introduce the hearsay statements without any showing of
unavailability, as long as they fall within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion.199 If the prosecution wishes to bring the child witness into court
and employ special procedures to aid the child's testimony, such as the
closed-circuit television used in Craig, it first must make a showing of
necessity. White's formalistic interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause thus may encourage the prosecution to introduce hearsay evi-
dence instead of bringing an available child into court.
2. Limiting the Unavailability Requirement to Former Testimony
In Idaho v. Wright,200 the Court addressed the question of whether
the unavailability requirement applied to the admission of a child sex
abuse victim's out-of-court statements. 20 1 The Wright Court used the
two-step approach set forth in Roberts,02 and stated that "to the extent
the unavailability requirement applies in this case" it had been met.203
The Court left open the question of whether the unavailability require-
197. See notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
198. This incentive would exist only if the child made out-of-court statements that are help-
ful to the state's case and are admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
199. For a discussion of the Court's unavailability analysis, see notes 15-24 and accompany-
ing text.
200. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
201. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
202. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146. See notes 13-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Roberts.
203. 110 S. Ct. at 3147.
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ment applies in the context of out-of-court statements in child sex
abuse cases. 0 4
The White Court unequivocally answered this question,0 5 stating
that courts should read Inadi to limit the Roberts unavailability re-
quirement to the introduction of former testimony.206 In White, the
Court did not require any showing of unavailability prior to the intro-
duction of the hearsay statements. The Court found that once the pros-
ecution shows that the hearsay statements fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied without a show-
ing of unavailability.0 7
Under White, when hearsay falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception, the Confrontation Clause affords a criminal defendant no pro-
tection above that which the evidence rules offer. 208 For example, the
Federal Rules of Evidence already require a showing of unavailability
before a party may introduce hearsay evidence under the former testi-
mony exception to the rule against hearsay.2 9 Because the Federal
Rules of Evidence already require unavailability in the case of former
testimony, the Confrontation Clause does not impose any additional
barriers to admission. If hearsay statements fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception that does not require a showing of unavailability, it is
clear after White that the Confrontation Clause does not either. Ac-
cording to the White Court,210 the requirements of the rules of evidence
satisfy the Sixth Amendment's mandates as long as the admission of
the out-of-court statement is made through a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.211
204. Id. The Court noted, however, that it held in Inadi that the unavailability requirement
did not apply to incriminating out-of-court statements made by non-testifying co-conspirators. Id.
at 3146.
205. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
206. Id. at 741. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text. Some commentators theorized that
Inadi seriously restricted the Roberts unavailability requirement by limiting the Roberts holding
to its facts. See, for example, Jonakait, 35 UCLA L. Rev. at 561 (cited in note 6). The White Court
affirmed this theory. See 112 S. Ct. at 741.
207. 112 S. Ct. at 741-42.
208. Professor Jonakait persuasively argues that, after Inadi, the Federal Rules of Evidence
in many instances provide a criminal defendant with greater protection than does the Confronta-
tion Clause. See Jonakait, 35 UCLA L. Rev. at 563-74.
209. See FRE 804(a). Former testimony falls under Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. This group of hearsay exceptions requires the party seeking the introduction of the evi-
dence to show that the declarant is unavailable. Most state rules of evidence follow the Federal
Rules and impose an unavailability requirement for former testimony.
210. 112 S. Ct. at 741-42.
211. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that neither the language of the
Confrontation Clause nor its history indicates that the Framers intended the Clause to apply to
hearsay. Id. at 748 (Thomas concurring). He suggested a reading of the Sixth Amendment that
would uncouple the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules. Id. (Thomas concurring). See also
Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev.
403, 496 (1992). Perhpas the White majority has uncoupled them by continually reducing the
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In addition to providing no protection above that which evidence
law affords, the limitation of the unavailability requirement to former
testimony again illustrates that the White Court did not interpret the
Confrontation Clause to provide a safeguard to a defendant's right to
an adversarial proceeding. 212 Unlike other hearsay exceptions, former
testimony is admissible because the party against whom testimony is
now offered had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
the time the testimony was originally given.21 In many instances, for-
mer testimony may be the best alternative to face-to-face confronta-
tion.214 Former testimony is given in the context of a judicial proceeding
and is subject to the procedural checks that the American adversary
system provides. These checks not only help ensure the reliability of
evidence admitted at trial, but protect other interests as well. 21 5
The White Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as a consti-
tutional guarantee of the admission of only reliable and probative evi-
dence against a criminal defendant.216 Based on this characterization,
the majority reasoned that the admission of reliable out-of-court state-
ments does not infringe this constitutional right. Even if the hearsay
testimony possesses sufficient guarantees of reliability, 218 it is unclear
that the sole purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the relia-
bility of evidence in a criminal trial.21 9
Sixth Amendment's restrictions on the admission of hearsay. The majority plainly stated that the
admissibility of hearsay testimony implicates concerns that are at the periphery of the interests
which the Confrontation Clause is designed to protect. 112 S. Ct. at 744. The White holding sug-
gests that the hearsay rules provide criminal defendants with sufficient confrontation protections
to safeguard these periphery interests. Thus, the White Court implicitly may have removed from
the Sixth Amendment all restrictions on the admissibility of hearsay statements.
212. For a persuasive argument that the purpose of the Clause is to preserve the American
adversary system, see generally Jonakait, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557 (cited in note 6). See also note 173.
213. See Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1987).
214. This assumption is true only if the defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant in the prior judicial proceeding. If the court curtailed the defendant's questioning of
the adverse witness at the prior proceeding or if the defendant was represented by incompetent
counsel, the former testimony may not be very valuable for Confrontation Clause purposes. See Id.
at 18-19.
215. See notes 172-76 and 194-95 and accompanying text.
216. See White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
217. Id.
218. See notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
219. See notes 169-76 and accompanying text. The relationship between the Confrontation
Clause and the introduction of hearsay evidence is the subject of much debate. The only consensus
in this area is that the relationship is obscure. See, for example, Jonakait, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557
(cited in note 6); Kirkpatrick, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 665 (cited in note 4); Lilly, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207
(cited in note 6).
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3. Preferring the Admission of Certain Out-of-Court Statements
Not only did the White Court make clear that Inadi limited the
unavailability requirement to the admission of former testimony, the
Court also explained that Inadi established the principle that admis-
sion of certain out-of-court statements is preferable to obtaining in-
court testimony from the witness.220 The White majority stated that the
Inadi analysis, in the co-conspirator context, applied fully to the facts
of White.22' 1 The Court reasoned that the circumstances under which
the victim in White made the out-of-court statements provided indica-
tors of reliability that in-court testimony could not duplicate.2 This
analysis is flawed in several respects.
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow admission of spontaneous
declarations and statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis
based on the assumption that the circumstances under which the state-
ments are made ensure their reliability.2 2' Many commentators, how-
ever, have questioned the reliability of spontaneous declarations.2 2 4 If
these statements are not in fact reliable, then White's justification for
their admissibility does not hold true. With respect to statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis, even assuming their reliability, any
information the declarant provides regarding the identity of the defend-
ant is not relevant to the declarant's diagnosis or treatment.2 As a
result, the statements concerning the identity of an assailant do not
carry the same guarantees of trustworthiness as do statements about
the cause of an injury22'6 and courts generally exclude them.2 2 7 In White,
the trial court did not limit the admission of testimony to statements
that were necessary for diagnosis or treatment, but rather allowed the
admission of testimony made during a medical evaluation concerning
the defendant's identity. The Supreme Court then allowed the admis-
sion of this hearsay to remain unchecked by the Confrontation Clause.
220. See notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
221. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742. See note 134 and accompanying text.
222. 112 S. Ct. at 743. See notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
223. See F.R.E. 803(2), 803(4). See also Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 4 Wein-
stein's Evidence §§ 803(2), 803(4) at 803-85 to 803-86, 803-144 (Matthew Bender, 1990).
224. Many commentators do not believe that there is a well reasoned explanation for labeling
spontaneous declarations as reliable. See, for example, Scallen, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 651 (cited in
note 191) (suggesting that spontaneous declarations are considered reliable because of tradition
rather than reliability in fact); Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 432, 439 (1928); Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5
Okla. L. Rev. 271, 286 (1952).
225. See Scallen, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 651-52 (cited in note 191). Professor Scallen noted that
misstating the cause of an injury might result in an incorrect diagnosis or an inappropriate treat-
ment, but statements regarding the identity of the assailant would not.
226. Id. at 652.
227. See id. at 652 n.113.
[Vol. 46:235
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
Under the Court's present Confrontation Clause analysis, if a pros-
ecutor offers an out-of-court statement under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, the admission of the statement is presumptively constitu-
tional.2 8 The Court allows this presumption for firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions reasoning that every statement admissible under them em-
bodies the "substance of the constitutional protection. '29 In order to
assess the validity of this assumption, courts would need to determine
whether every statement that falls within a hearsay exception is
reliable.30
As some commentators have suggested, the firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions may not possess sufficient guarantees of reliability23l and
even if they do, the Supreme Court has never defined "firmly
rooted. '232 Often courts justify classifying an exception as firmly rooted
by noting that the exception has existed for a long time.233 Another pos-
sible indicator is the number of jurisdictions that recognize the hearsay
exception.23' The Court also has considered whether the Federal Rules
of Evidence acknowledge the exception.2 5 None of these justifications
provides an absolute guarantee that the hearsay admitted pursuant to
firmly rooted exceptions is reliable.2386 Without a well-reasoned defini-
tion for "firmly rooted," the risk exists that a court will give a presump-
tion of constitutionality to evidence that is not necessarily reliable.237
Therefore, even if the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is ensuring
the reliability and probativeness of evidence, allowing-and in some in-
228. See Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 7 (cited in note 213).
229. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). See
also Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 7.
230. See Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 9.
231. See generally id. See also note 224 and accompanying text; Glen Weissenberger, Hear-
say Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), 64 Temple L. Rev. 145, 145 (1991)
(stating that all hearsay is unreliable).
232. Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 7; Lilly, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 228 (cited in note 6).
233. The majority in White used this justification to support finding that the exception for
spontaneous declarations was firmly rooted. The Court noted that the spontaneous declaration
exception was at least two hundred years old. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 n.8. See also Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987); Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 12.
234. The White Court noted that both the exception for spontaneous declarations and the
exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis were recognized in almost
four-fifths of the states. 112 S. Ct. at 742 n.8. See also Lilly, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 228.
235. The White majority noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize exceptions for
spontaneous declarations and statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis. 112 S. Ct. at
742 n.8.
236. Goldman, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 11-15.
237. See id. at 15. Professor Goldman reasoned that once an exception is classified as firmly
rooted all evidence admitted pursuant to it will possess a presumption of reliability which it may
not warrant. In addition, Professor Goldman noted that the reliability of different statements ad-
mitted under the same exception may vary. He suggested that a court must test the reliability of
each statement using an ad hoc approach. Id. at 45-47.
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stances preferring-the admission of firmly rooted hearsay may not
serve that goal.
B. Has the Court Constitutionalized the Hearsay Rules?
The Supreme Court's recent Confrontation Clause decisions have
liberalized the government's ability to introduce hearsay evidence in
criminal prosecutions. White v. Illinois is no exception. In White, the
Supreme Court showed great deference to the hearsay exceptions. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed his fear that the Court's
recent Confrontation Clause cases have moved toward constitutionaliz-
ing the hearsay rules.3 8 Many commentators have asserted that the Su-
preme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has had this
effect.2 9 The Court, on several occasions, has noted that the Confronta-
tion Clause and the hearsay rules protect similar interests240 and stem
from the same origins. 41
The Court, however, has disavowed the contention that it has con-
stitutionalized the hearsay rules.242 The Court's holding in Idaho v.
Wright supports this contention. The Wright Court found that the
residual hearsay exception was not firmly rooted and did not allow the
automatic admission of the hearsay testimony. This decision illustrates
that not every hearsay exception is firmly rooted and therefore
constitutionalized. 24
3
Wright, however, does not rule out the possibility that the Su-
preme Court has constitutionalized the firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions. If this interpretation is correct, several results follow. First, once
a court finds that testimony falls within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion, no Confrontation Clause analysis is required. 44 Thus, by satisfy-
238. White, 112 S. Ct. at 748 (Thomas concurring).
239. See, for example, Van Kessel, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 495 (cited in note 211); Edward
J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 521,
521 (1992); Lilly, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev: at 210 (cited in note 6).
240. 112 S. Ct. at 741. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (stating that the
"hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar interests");
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146; Van Kessel, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 495.
241. 112 S. Ct. at 741. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (stating that the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules "stem from the same roots").
242. 112 S. Ct. at 741. See also Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146 (stating that-the Court has been
careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause and the rules excluding hearsay).
243. The question of whether there are other hearsay exceptions that are not firmly rooted
remains open. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case involving the admission of
statements against interest. People v. Watkins, 475 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 933 (1992).
244. At least one court has interpreted White in this way. See United States v. Beckham,
968 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that the hearsay exception for adoptive admissions was
firmly rooted and, therefore, no independent inquiry under the Confrontation Clause was required
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ing the evidence rules, the prosecution also has satisfied the
Confrontation Clause because the protections of the two are one and
the same with respect to firmly rooted hearsay. This allows the govern-
ment essentially to ignore the Confrontation Clause for purposes of in-
troducing firmly rooted hearsay.
Another consequence of constitutionalizing the hearsay rules is
that the rules are frozen."4 5 A legislature may not reduce the protections
that the rules of evidence afford without facing constitutional limita-
tions. The rules are no longer merely creations of legislative enactment,
but have been elevated to constitutional status.246 The danger exists
that if the Supreme Court is wrong and the firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ceptions in fact do not ensure reliability, 47 then the Court has constitu-
tionalized these errors, freezing them into place.
C. What Confrontation Clause Protections Are Still Available to
Criminal Defendants?
Child sex abuse cases are tragic and disturbing. White v. Illinois
underscores the special concerns that are present when the prosecution
needs a child's testimony.24 Although the Court in White reached a
result that is unobjectionable when considered along with the facts of
the case, the holding will have far reaching effects.
The majority did not limit its Confrontation Clause analysis to
child sex abuse cases, but announced a blanket policy applicable in all
criminal proceedings. The prosecution may introduce hearsay testimony
of available witnesses as long as the testimony falls within a firmly
rooted exception, despite the fact that the particular case does not pre-
sent any special concerns, such as those at issue with a child witness.
Therefore, White v. Illinois will reduce the Confrontation Clause pro-
tections for all criminal defendants.
It is not yet clear how much the White Court's holding will reduce
the protections available to criminal defendants. Perhaps there are
other hearsay exceptions, in addition to the residual exceptions, that
once the court determined that the statements were properly admitted under the hearsay
exception).
245. See, for example, Van Kessel, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 495; Imwinkelried, 76 Minn. L.
Rev. at 522.
246. See Van Kessel, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 495-97 (stating that the constitutionalization
of the hearsay rules prevents reform of the rules of evidence and other aspects of the trial process).
247. This assumes for purposes of argument that the Court is correct in interpreting the
goals of the Confrontation Clause as ensuring the admission of reliable and probative evidence.
248. For a discussion of the special concerns relating to child witnesses see Brian L. Schwalb,
Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized Witnesses: Defining "Confronta-
tion" to Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 185 (1991). See also
note 48.
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are not firmly rooted.2"" If so, the Court may require the prosecution to
show that the hearsay bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness," thereby providing the criminal defendant with increased Con-
frontation Clause protections.
In addition, state courts may provide criminal defendants with
greater confrontation protection than White mandates.2"' State courts
are free to reject White's limitations of the unavailability and necessity
requirements, and they may provide greater confrontation protections
under their state constitutions.2 51 After White, protection of a criminal
defendant's confrontation right may rest with the state courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The meaning of the Confrontation Clause remains unclear. The
White Court framed its Confrontation Clause analysis in terms of en-
suring the admission of reliable and probative evidence. In so doing, the
majority limited its prior safeguards for criminal defendants' confronta-
tion rights. By restricting the necessity requirement of Coy and Craig to
special in-court procedures, the Court found hearsay that was not sub-
ject to cross-examination was more consistent with the goals of the
Confrontation Clause than in-court testimony under child-protective
procedures. The limitation of Roberts' unavailability requirement to
former testimony again reduced the Confrontation Clause protections
available to criminal defendants by imposing fewer requirements on
prosecutors seeking to introduce uncross-examined out-of-court state-
ments than testimony that has been subject to some form of cross-ex-
amination. The Court underscored this reduction of criminal
defendants' confrontation rights by emphasizing that Inadi created a
249. Thus far, the residual hearsay exception is the only hearsay exception that the Court
has determined was not firmly rooted. See Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3141-42 (1990). See also note 243.
250. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) (urging state courts to protect the individual liberties of
citizens under both the Federal and State Constitutions).
251. For an example of a state court extending greater confrontation protection to a criminal
defendant, see Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 373-75 (Mass. 1988) (requiring a
case-specific finding of unavailability in order to satisfy the confrontation provision of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution). See also Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. 1991) (stating that the
Indiana Constitution provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
•.. to meet the witnesses face-to-face"). The Indiana court found fundamental error when the trial
court failed to comply with the state constitution's face-to-face provision. The court stated that
"[t]he face-to-face requirement of our state constitution is separate and in addition to the confron-
tation right afforded by the same provision and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution." Id.
Several commentators have suggested that state courts should provide greater confrontation
protection under their state constitutions. See, for example, Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitu-
tionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76
Minn. L. Rev. 557, 605 (1992); Scallen, 76 Minn. L. Rev at 653 (cited in note 191).
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Sixth Amendment preference for out-of-court statements under certain
circumstances. The Court's preference for reliable and probative out-of-
court statements ignores other interests that the Framers may have in-
tended for the Confrontation Clause to protect.
The constitutional implications of White are potentially great. The
Court's further reduction of the Confrontation Clause may have re-
sulted in the constitutionalization of the hearsay rules, or at least the
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. If so, the Court has allowed evidence
law to dictate the scope of the Sixth Amendment. The danger exists
that the Court may have constitutionalized rules that in fact do not
serve the intended goals of the Confrontation Clause.
The White decision will have a significant impact on the confronta-
tion rights of all criminal defendants. The Court did not limit its hold-
ing to child sex abuse cases, but announced a broad ruling applicable to
all criminal defendants. The Court chose a very narrow reading of the
protections that the Sixth Amendment was intended to provide. Al-
though the meaning of the Confrontation Clause remains unsettled, it is
clear that criminal defendants can no longer look to the Sixth Amend-
ment for signficant confrontation protections.
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